Jurisdiction: Recent Supreme Court case infringes on drivers’ fourth amendment right, grants police discriminatory power

Recent Supreme Court case Kansas v. Glover mandates that police officers can pull over a driver solely due to the car belonging to a driver with a suspended license. This precedent may infringe on the driver's fourth amendment right because they can…

Recent Supreme Court case Kansas v. Glover mandates that police officers can pull over a driver solely due to the car belonging to a driver with a suspended license. This precedent may infringe on the driver's fourth amendment right because they can be pulled over without probable cause or violation of any laws (Photo courtesy of Sutherland 213 Commodore SS traffic stop/Wikimedia ). 

On April 6 the U.S. Supreme Court decided on a case called Kansas v. Glover which looked to answer the question of whether the Fourth Amendment enables an officer to stop a car solely based on the fact that the registered owner’s license is revoked. The 8-1 majority found that under the Fourth Amendment a cop, without any evidence that disputes their intuition that the driver of a vehicle is most likely the person the vehicle is registered under, can perform an investigative traffic stop after discovering that the registered owner’s driver’s license has been revoked. This case sets an intrusive precedent that has major implications on the way officers can conduct traffic stops.

This case involves Sheriff’s Deputy Mark Meher who ran a check on a license plate of a pickup truck that was registered under Charles Glover Jr. Despite the truck not breaking any driving laws, upon the deputy discovering that Glover’s license was revoked, they pulled it over under the assumption that the driver would be Glover. Glover was then prosecuted for driving with a revoked license, however, he looked to suppress the evidence at trial claiming that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment—Glover’s protection against unreasonable search and seizures.

The Supreme Court’s decision reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision which granted Glover’s motion to suppress evidence at his trial. The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that Deputy Mark Meher’s decision to stop Glover’s car based on their supposition that Glover would be the driver equated to a “mere hunch,” a hunch which assumed both that Glover would disregard the fact that his license was revoked and nevertheless continue to operate their vehicle and that the operator of the vehicle would be the registered owner of it.

Using precedents set by an array of cases including United States v. Cortez, Terry v. Ohio and Prado Navarette v. California, the Court concluded that the level of suspicion necessary for a cop to initiate an investigative traffic stop is “… less than the proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of evidence.” Additionally, with Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court supported the Deputy by saying that they are reserved the right to use commonsense when judging suspicion.

This case has major implications on the power that police wield to conduct an investigative stop and it is an interesting case to look at due to its nature. Considering that the precedent set now enables police across the United States to stop a vehicle because the registered owner of a car’s license is suspended or revoked is concerning for a variety of reasons, one of which is because a vast number of suspended driver’s licenses do not stem from driving related causes but because of unpaid fees and fines.

According to Free to Drive, a campaign which looks to limit restrictions on driving to cases of dangerous driving, in the United States there are 11 million suspended licenses that are the result of unpaid traffic, toll, misdemeanor and felony fines and fees. In 2017, more than 100,000 Kansas driver’s licenses were suspended for not paying traffic tickets and two-thirds of Ohio suspensions were also not related to driving. The ability to drive is a necessity and the fact that officers could pull a driver over for a suspended license alone, which may not stem from their driving, is asinine and dangerous.

Furthermore, the assumption that the owner of a car is driving the car is erroneous because of the nature of driving. Families share cars as do friends. Thus, a driver can be pulled over for no fault of their own because their friend or family member has a suspended license.

This sentiment is expressed in the concurring opinion’s argument when Justice Kagan writes that if Glover’s license were suspended rather than revoked, the officer would not have reasonable suspicion and their common sense would be a “mere hunch.” This stems from the fact that Kansas revokes a license if the license holder commits serious and/or repeated driving offenses. Kagan therefore concludes that “… a person with a revoked license has already shown a willingness to flout driving restrictions…” and that the majority opinion’s decision is correct for the circumstances surrounding Glover’s case.

The precedent this case sets also problematically enables officers to pull cars over despite the driver not breaking driving laws. An officer can now pull a car over merely because the registered owner has a suspended or revoked license. Therefore, even if the driver (who may or may not be the registered owner) is driving legally, they can be pulled over and subject to a traffic stop due to an officer running a plate check.

This means officers can interrogate the driver and look around their car despite the driver not committing any traffic violations. In fact, the officer can do this even if the driver is not the registered owner. This is a legitimate problem to every driver because driving a car connected to a suspended license increases the driver’s chances of being pulled over.

According to the Stanford Open Policing Project, after investigating 100 million traffic stops from 2010-2017 across 21 state patrol agencies, it was concluded that there was evidence of “… widespread discrimination in decisions to stop and search drivers.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision can empower officers to continue this practice on the basis that a registered owner’s license is suspended or revoked. Thus, contrary to what the State of Kansas claimed, the “innocent driver of a borrowed car” does have something to fear.

Given Glover did have a revoked license, the majority opinion’s decision that Meher used his commonsense judgment seems justified, however, Kagan’s hypothetical scenario offers the idea that different conditions can dispute and invalidate an officer’s reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the majority opinion noting that the officer’s reasonable suspicion would be diminished if the officer knew more information about the driver that would contradict their initial assumption is important because it implies that an officer cannot pull a car over merely based on their assumption that the registered owner is the driver.

However, what stops an officer from conducting an investigative stop because somebody looks like the registered owner? What about if they “do not see” the driver? Numerous hypotheticals can easily raise legitimate questions regarding the potential abuse of civil liberties as well as other implications of this decision.

Nonetheless, the power this gives an officer to make assumptions is dangerous and sets a precedent which empowers the police and disenfranchises every driver.